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R. Arends
Telematica Instituut
R. Austein
ISC
M. Larson
VeriSign
D. Massey
Colorado State University
S. Rose
NIST
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DNS Security Introduction and Requirements

Status of This Memo

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Abstract

The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System. This document introduces these extensions and describes their capabilities and limitations. This document also discusses the services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide. Last, this document describes the interrelationships between the documents that collectively describe DNSSEC.

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1. Introduction

This document introduces the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). This document and its two companion documents ([RFC4034] and [RFC4035]) update, clarify, and refine the security extensions defined in [RFC2535] and its predecessors. These security extensions consist of a set of new resource record types and modifications to the existing DNS protocol ([RFC1035]). The new records and protocol modifications are not fully described in this document, but are described in a family of documents outlined in Section 10. Sections 3 and 4 describe the capabilities and limitations of the security extensions in greater detail. Section 5 discusses the scope of the document set. Sections 6, 7, 8, and 9 discuss the effect that these security extensions will have on resolvers, stub resolvers, zones, and name servers.

This document and its two companions obsolete [RFC2535], [RFC3008], [RFC3090], [RFC3445], [RFC3655], [RFC3658], [RFC3755], [RFC3757], and [RFC3845]. This document set also updates but does not obsolete [RFC1034], [RFC1035], [RFC2136], [RFC2181], [RFC2308], [RFC3225], [RFC3007], [RFC3597], and the portions of [RFC3226] that deal with DNSSEC.

The DNS security extensions provide origin authentication and integrity protection for DNS data, as well as a means of public key distribution. These extensions do not provide confidentiality.

2. Definitions of Important DNSSEC Terms

This section defines a number of terms used in this document set. Because this is intended to be useful as a reference while reading the rest of the document set, first-time readers may wish to skim this section quickly, read the rest of this document, and then come back to this section.

Authentication Chain: An alternating sequence of DNS public key (DNSKEY) RRsets and Delegation Signer (DS) RRsets forms a chain of signed data, with each link in the chain vouching for the next. A DNSKEY RR is used to verify the signature covering a DS RR and allows the DS RR to be authenticated. The DS RR contains a hash of another DNSKEY RR and this new DNSKEY RR is authenticated by matching the hash in the DS RR. This new DNSKEY RR in turn authenticates another DNSKEY RRset and, in turn, some DNSKEY RR in this set may be used to authenticate another DS RR, and so forth until the chain finally ends with a DNSKEY RR whose corresponding private key signs the desired DNS data. For example, the root DNSKEY RRset can be used to authenticate the DS RRset for "example." The "example." DS RRset contains a hash that matches some "example." DNSKEY, and this DNSKEY's corresponding private key signs the "example." DNSKEY RRset. Private key counterparts of the "example." DNSKEY RRset sign data records such as "www.example." and DS RRs for delegations such as "subzone.example."

Authentication Key: A public key that a security-aware resolver has verified and can therefore use to authenticate data. A security-aware resolver can obtain authentication keys in three ways. First, the resolver is generally configured to know about at least one public key; this configured data is usually either the public key itself or a hash of the public key as found in the DS RR (see "trust anchor"). Second, the resolver may use an authenticated public key to verify a DS RR and the DNSKEY RR to which the DS RR refers. Third, the resolver may be able to determine that a new public key has been signed by the private key corresponding to another public key that the resolver has verified. Note that the resolver must always be guided by local policy when deciding whether to authenticate a new public key, even if the local policy is simply to authenticate any new public key for which the resolver is able verify the signature.

Authoritative RRset: Within the context of a particular zone, an RRset is "authoritative" if and only if the owner name of the RRset lies within the subset of the name space that is at or below the zone apex and at or above the cuts that separate the zone from its children, if any. All RRsets at the zone apex are authoritative, except for certain RRsets at this domain name that, if present, belong to this zone's parent. These RRset could include a DS RRset, the NSEC RRset referencing this DS RRset (the "parental NSEC"), and RRSIG RRs associated with these RRsets, all of which are authoritative in the parent zone. Similarly, if this zone contains any delegation points, only the parental NSEC RRset, DS RRsets, and any RRSIG RRs associated with these RRsets are authoritative for this zone.

Delegation Point: Term used to describe the name at the parental side of a zone cut. That is, the delegation point for "foo.example" would be the foo.example node in the "example" zone (as opposed to the zone apex of the "foo.example" zone). See also zone apex.

Island of Security: Term used to describe a signed, delegated zone that does not have an authentication chain from its delegating parent. That is, there is no DS RR containing a hash of a DNSKEY RR for the island in its delegating parent zone (see [RFC4034]). An island of security is served by security-aware name servers and may provide authentication chains to any delegated child zones. Responses from an island of security or its descendents can only be authenticated if its authentication keys can be authenticated by some trusted means out of band from the DNS protocol.

Key Signing Key (KSK): An authentication key that corresponds to a private key used to sign one or more other authentication keys for a given zone. Typically, the private key corresponding to a key signing key will sign a zone signing key, which in turn has a corresponding private key that will sign other zone data. Local policy may require that the zone signing key be changed frequently, while the key signing key may have a longer validity period in order to provide a more stable secure entry point into the zone. Designating an authentication key as a key signing key is purely an operational issue: DNSSEC validation does not distinguish between key signing keys and other DNSSEC authentication keys, and it is possible to use a single key as both a key signing key and a zone signing key. Key signing keys are discussed in more detail in [RFC3757]. Also see zone signing key.

Non-Validating Security-Aware Stub Resolver: A security-aware stub resolver that trusts one or more security-aware recursive name servers to perform most of the tasks discussed in this document set on its behalf. In particular, a non-validating security-aware stub resolver is an entity that sends DNS queries, receives DNS responses, and is capable of establishing an appropriately secured channel to a security-aware recursive name server that will provide these services on behalf of the security-aware stub resolver. See also security-aware stub resolver, validating security-aware stub resolver.

Non-Validating Stub Resolver: A less tedious term for a non-validating security-aware stub resolver.

Security-Aware Name Server: An entity acting in the role of a name server (defined in section 2.4 of [RFC1034]) that understands the DNS security extensions defined in this document set. In particular, a security-aware name server is an entity that receives DNS queries, sends DNS responses, supports the EDNS0 ([RFC2671]) message size extension and the DO bit ([RFC3225]), and supports the RR types and message header bits defined in this document set.

Security-Aware Recursive Name Server: An entity that acts in both the security-aware name server and security-aware resolver roles. A more cumbersome but equivalent phrase would be "a security-aware name server that offers recursive service".

Security-Aware Resolver: An entity acting in the role of a resolver (defined in section 2.4 of [RFC1034]) that understands the DNS security extensions defined in this document set. In particular, a security-aware resolver is an entity that sends DNS queries, receives DNS responses, supports the EDNS0 ([RFC2671]) message size extension and the DO bit ([RFC3225]), and is capable of using the RR types and message header bits defined in this document set to provide DNSSEC services.

Security-Aware Stub Resolver: An entity acting in the role of a stub resolver (defined in section 5.3.1 of [RFC1034]) that has enough of an understanding the DNS security extensions defined in this document set to provide additional services not available from a security-oblivious stub resolver. Security-aware stub resolvers may be either "validating" or "non-validating", depending on whether the stub resolver attempts to verify DNSSEC signatures on its own or trusts a friendly security-aware name server to do so. See also validating stub resolver, non-validating stub resolver.

Security-Oblivious <anything>: An <anything> that is not "security-aware".

Signed Zone: A zone whose RRsets are signed and that contains properly constructed DNSKEY, Resource Record Signature (RRSIG), Next Secure (NSEC), and (optionally) DS records.

Trust Anchor: A configured DNSKEY RR or DS RR hash of a DNSKEY RR. A validating security-aware resolver uses this public key or hash as a starting point for building the authentication chain to a signed DNS response. In general, a validating resolver will have to obtain the initial values of its trust anchors via some secure or trusted means outside the DNS protocol. Presence of a trust anchor also implies that the resolver should expect the zone to which the trust anchor points to be signed.

Unsigned Zone: A zone that is not signed.

Validating Security-Aware Stub Resolver: A security-aware resolver that sends queries in recursive mode but that performs signature validation on its own rather than just blindly trusting an upstream security-aware recursive name server. See also security-aware stub resolver, non-validating security-aware stub resolver.

Validating Stub Resolver: A less tedious term for a validating security-aware stub resolver.

Zone Apex: Term used to describe the name at the child's side of a zone cut. See also delegation point.

Zone Signing Key (ZSK): An authentication key that corresponds to a private key used to sign a zone. Typically, a zone signing key will be part of the same DNSKEY RRset as the key signing key whose corresponding private key signs this DNSKEY RRset, but the zone signing key is used for a slightly different purpose and may differ from the key signing key in other ways, such as validity lifetime. Designating an authentication key as a zone signing key is purely an operational issue; DNSSEC validation does not distinguish between zone signing keys and other DNSSEC authentication keys, and it is possible to use a single key as both a key signing key and a zone signing key. See also key signing key.

3. Services Provided by DNS Security

The Domain Name System (DNS) security extensions provide origin authentication and integrity assurance services for DNS data, including mechanisms for authenticated denial of existence of DNS data. These mechanisms are described below.

These mechanisms require changes to the DNS protocol. DNSSEC adds four new resource record types: Resource Record Signature (RRSIG), DNS Public Key (DNSKEY), Delegation Signer (DS), and Next Secure (NSEC). It also adds two new message header bits: Checking Disabled (CD) and Authenticated Data (AD). In order to support the larger DNS message sizes that result from adding the DNSSEC RRs, DNSSEC also requires EDNS0 support ([RFC2671]). Finally, DNSSEC requires support for the DNSSEC OK (DO) EDNS header bit ([RFC3225]) so that a security-aware resolver can indicate in its queries that it wishes to receive DNSSEC RRs in response messages.

These services protect against most of the threats to the Domain Name System described in [RFC3833]. Please see Section 12 for a discussion of the limitations of these extensions.

3.1. Data Origin Authentication and Data Integrity

DNSSEC provides authentication by associating cryptographically generated digital signatures with DNS RRsets. These digital signatures are stored in a new resource record, the RRSIG record. Typically, there will be a single private key that signs a zone's data, but multiple keys are possible. For example, there may be keys for each of several different digital signature algorithms. If a security-aware resolver reliably learns a zone's public key, it can authenticate that zone's signed data. An important DNSSEC concept is that the key that signs a zone's data is associated with the zone itself and not with the zone's authoritative name servers. (Public keys for DNS transaction authentication mechanisms may also appear in zones, as described in [RFC2931], but DNSSEC itself is concerned with object security of DNS data, not channel security of DNS transactions. The keys associated with transaction security may be stored in different RR types. See [RFC3755] for details.)

A security-aware resolver can learn a zone's public key either by having a trust anchor configured into the resolver or by normal DNS resolution. To allow the latter, public keys are stored in a new type of resource record, the DNSKEY RR. Note that the private keys used to sign zone data must be kept secure and should be stored offline when practical. To discover a public key reliably via DNS resolution, the target key itself has to be signed by either a configured authentication key or another key that has been

authenticated previously. Security-aware resolvers authenticate zone information by forming an authentication chain from a newly learned public key back to a previously known authentication public key, which in turn either has been configured into the resolver or must have been learned and verified previously. Therefore, the resolver must be configured with at least one trust anchor.

If the configured trust anchor is a zone signing key, then it will authenticate the associated zone; if the configured key is a key signing key, it will authenticate a zone signing key. If the configured trust anchor is the hash of a key rather than the key itself, the resolver may have to obtain the key via a DNS query. To help security-aware resolvers establish this authentication chain, security-aware name servers attempt to send the signature(s) needed to authenticate a zone's public key(s) in the DNS reply message along with the public key itself, provided that there is space available in the message.

The Delegation Signer (DS) RR type simplifies some of the administrative tasks involved in signing delegations across organizational boundaries. The DS RRset resides at a delegation point in a parent zone and indicates the public key(s) corresponding to the private key(s) used to self-sign the DNSKEY RRset at the delegated child zone's apex. The administrator of the child zone, in turn, uses the private key(s) corresponding to one or more of the public keys in this DNSKEY RRset to sign the child zone's data. The typical authentication chain is therefore `DNSKEY->[DS->DNSKEY]*->RRset`, where "*" denotes zero or more `DS->DNSKEY` subchains. DNSSEC permits more complex authentication chains, such as additional layers of DNSKEY RRs signing other DNSKEY RRs within a zone.

A security-aware resolver normally constructs this authentication chain from the root of the DNS hierarchy down to the leaf zones based on configured knowledge of the public key for the root. Local policy, however, may also allow a security-aware resolver to use one or more configured public keys (or hashes of public keys) other than the root public key, may not provide configured knowledge of the root public key, or may prevent the resolver from using particular public keys for arbitrary reasons, even if those public keys are properly signed with verifiable signatures. DNSSEC provides mechanisms by which a security-aware resolver can determine whether an RRset's signature is "valid" within the meaning of DNSSEC. In the final analysis, however, authenticating both DNS keys and data is a matter of local policy, which may extend or even override the protocol extensions defined in this document set. See Section 5 for further discussion.

3.2. Authenticating Name and Type Non-Existence

The security mechanism described in Section 3.1 only provides a way to sign existing RRsets in a zone. The problem of providing negative responses with the same level of authentication and integrity requires the use of another new resource record type, the NSEC record. The NSEC record allows a security-aware resolver to authenticate a negative reply for either name or type non-existence with the same mechanisms used to authenticate other DNS replies. Use of NSEC records requires a canonical representation and ordering for domain names in zones. Chains of NSEC records explicitly describe the gaps, or "empty space", between domain names in a zone and list the types of RRsets present at existing names. Each NSEC record is signed and authenticated using the mechanisms described in Section 3.1.

4. Services Not Provided by DNS Security

DNS was originally designed with the assumptions that the DNS will return the same answer to any given query regardless of who may have issued the query, and that all data in the DNS is thus visible. Accordingly, DNSSEC is not designed to provide confidentiality, access control lists, or other means of differentiating between inquirers.

DNSSEC provides no protection against denial of service attacks. Security-aware resolvers and security-aware name servers are vulnerable to an additional class of denial of service attacks based on cryptographic operations. Please see Section 12 for details.

The DNS security extensions provide data and origin authentication for DNS data. The mechanisms outlined above are not designed to protect operations such as zone transfers and dynamic update ([RFC2136], [RFC3007]). Message authentication schemes described in [RFC2845] and [RFC2931] address security operations that pertain to these transactions.

5. Scope of the DNSSEC Document Set and Last Hop Issues

The specification in this document set defines the behavior for zone signers and security-aware name servers and resolvers in such a way that the validating entities can unambiguously determine the state of the data.

A validating resolver can determine the following 4 states:

Secure: The validating resolver has a trust anchor, has a chain of trust, and is able to verify all the signatures in the response.

Insecure: The validating resolver has a trust anchor, a chain of trust, and, at some delegation point, signed proof of the non-existence of a DS record. This indicates that subsequent branches in the tree are provably insecure. A validating resolver may have a local policy to mark parts of the domain space as insecure.

Bogus: The validating resolver has a trust anchor and a secure delegation indicating that subsidiary data is signed, but the response fails to validate for some reason: missing signatures, expired signatures, signatures with unsupported algorithms, data missing that the relevant NSEC RR says should be present, and so forth.

Indeterminate: There is no trust anchor that would indicate that a specific portion of the tree is secure. This is the default operation mode.

This specification only defines how security-aware name servers can signal non-validating stub resolvers that data was found to be bogus (using RCODE=2, "Server Failure"; see [RFC4035]).

There is a mechanism for security-aware name servers to signal security-aware stub resolvers that data was found to be secure (using the AD bit; see [RFC4035]).

This specification does not define a format for communicating why responses were found to be bogus or marked as insecure. The current signaling mechanism does not distinguish between indeterminate and insecure states.

A method for signaling advanced error codes and policy between a security-aware stub resolver and security-aware recursive nameservers is a topic for future work, as is the interface between a security-aware resolver and the applications that use it. Note, however, that the lack of the specification of such communication does not prohibit deployment of signed zones or the deployment of security aware recursive name servers that prohibit propagation of bogus data to the applications.

6. Resolver Considerations

A security-aware resolver has to be able to perform cryptographic functions necessary to verify digital signatures using at least the mandatory-to-implement algorithm(s). Security-aware resolvers must also be capable of forming an authentication chain from a newly learned zone back to an authentication key, as described above. This process might require additional queries to intermediate DNS zones to

obtain necessary DNSKEY, DS, and RRSIG records. A security-aware resolver should be configured with at least one trust anchor as the starting point from which it will attempt to establish authentication chains.

If a security-aware resolver is separated from the relevant authoritative name servers by a recursive name server or by any sort of intermediary device that acts as a proxy for DNS, and if the recursive name server or intermediary device is not security-aware, the security-aware resolver may not be capable of operating in a secure mode. For example, if a security-aware resolver's packets are routed through a network address translation (NAT) device that includes a DNS proxy that is not security-aware, the security-aware resolver may find it difficult or impossible to obtain or validate signed DNS data. The security-aware resolver may have a particularly difficult time obtaining DS RRs in such a case, as DS RRs do not follow the usual DNS rules for ownership of RRs at zone cuts. Note that this problem is not specific to NATs: any security-oblivious DNS software of any kind between the security-aware resolver and the authoritative name servers will interfere with DNSSEC.

If a security-aware resolver must rely on an unsigned zone or a name server that is not security aware, the resolver may not be able to validate DNS responses and will need a local policy on whether to accept unverified responses.

A security-aware resolver should take a signature's validation period into consideration when determining the TTL of data in its cache, to avoid caching signed data beyond the validity period of the signature. However, it should also allow for the possibility that the security-aware resolver's own clock is wrong. Thus, a security-aware resolver that is part of a security-aware recursive name server will have to pay careful attention to the DNSSEC "checking disabled" (CD) bit ([RFC4034]). This is in order to avoid blocking valid signatures from getting through to other security-aware resolvers that are clients of this recursive name server. See [RFC4035] for how a secure recursive server handles queries with the CD bit set.

7. Stub Resolver Considerations

Although not strictly required to do so by the protocol, most DNS queries originate from stub resolvers. Stub resolvers, by definition, are minimal DNS resolvers that use recursive query mode to offload most of the work of DNS resolution to a recursive name server. Given the widespread use of stub resolvers, the DNSSEC

architecture has to take stub resolvers into account, but the security features needed in a stub resolver differ in some respects from those needed in a security-aware iterative resolver.

Even a security-oblivious stub resolver may benefit from DNSSEC if the recursive name servers it uses are security-aware, but for the stub resolver to place any real reliance on DNSSEC services, the stub resolver must trust both the recursive name servers in question and the communication channels between itself and those name servers. The first of these issues is a local policy issue: in essence, a security-oblivious stub resolver has no choice but to place itself at the mercy of the recursive name servers that it uses, as it does not perform DNSSEC validity checks on its own. The second issue requires some kind of channel security mechanism; proper use of DNS transaction authentication mechanisms such as SIG(0) ([RFC2931]) or TSIG ([RFC2845]) would suffice, as would appropriate use of IPsec. Particular implementations may have other choices available, such as operating system specific interprocess communication mechanisms. Confidentiality is not needed for this channel, but data integrity and message authentication are.

A security-aware stub resolver that does trust both its recursive name servers and its communication channel to them may choose to examine the setting of the Authenticated Data (AD) bit in the message header of the response messages it receives. The stub resolver can use this flag bit as a hint to find out whether the recursive name server was able to validate signatures for all of the data in the Answer and Authority sections of the response.

There is one more step that a security-aware stub resolver can take if, for whatever reason, it is not able to establish a useful trust relationship with the recursive name servers that it uses: it can perform its own signature validation by setting the Checking Disabled (CD) bit in its query messages. A validating stub resolver is thus able to treat the DNSSEC signatures as trust relationships between the zone administrators and the stub resolver itself.

8. Zone Considerations

There are several differences between signed and unsigned zones. A signed zone will contain additional security-related records (RRSIG, DNSKEY, DS, and NSEC records). RRSIG and NSEC records may be generated by a signing process prior to serving the zone. The RRSIG records that accompany zone data have defined inception and expiration times that establish a validity period for the signatures and the zone data the signatures cover.

8.1. TTL Values vs. RRSIG Validity Period

It is important to note the distinction between a RRset's TTL value and the signature validity period specified by the RRSIG RR covering that RRset. DNSSEC does not change the definition or function of the TTL value, which is intended to maintain database coherency in caches. A caching resolver purges RRsets from its cache no later than the end of the time period specified by the TTL fields of those RRsets, regardless of whether the resolver is security-aware.

The inception and expiration fields in the RRSIG RR ([RFC4034]), on the other hand, specify the time period during which the signature can be used to validate the covered RRset. The signatures associated with signed zone data are only valid for the time period specified by these fields in the RRSIG RRs in question. TTL values cannot extend the validity period of signed RRsets in a resolver's cache, but the resolver may use the time remaining before expiration of the signature validity period of a signed RRset as an upper bound for the TTL of the signed RRset and its associated RRSIG RR in the resolver's cache.

8.2. New Temporal Dependency Issues for Zones

Information in a signed zone has a temporal dependency that did not exist in the original DNS protocol. A signed zone requires regular maintenance to ensure that each RRset in the zone has a current valid RRSIG RR. The signature validity period of an RRSIG RR is an interval during which the signature for one particular signed RRset can be considered valid, and the signatures of different RRsets in a zone may expire at different times. Re-signing one or more RRsets in a zone will change one or more RRSIG RRs, which will in turn require incrementing the zone's SOA serial number to indicate that a zone change has occurred and re-signing the SOA RRset itself. Thus, re-signing any RRset in a zone may also trigger DNS NOTIFY messages and zone transfer operations.

9. Name Server Considerations

A security-aware name server should include the appropriate DNSSEC records (RRSIG, DNSKEY, DS, and NSEC) in all responses to queries from resolvers that have signaled their willingness to receive such records via use of the DO bit in the EDNS header, subject to message size limitations. Because inclusion of these DNSSEC RRs could easily cause UDP message truncation and fallback to TCP, a security-aware name server must also support the EDNS "sender's UDP payload" mechanism.

If possible, the private half of each DNSSEC key pair should be kept offline, but this will not be possible for a zone for which DNS dynamic update has been enabled. In the dynamic update case, the primary master server for the zone will have to re-sign the zone when it is updated, so the private key corresponding to the zone signing key will have to be kept online. This is an example of a situation in which the ability to separate the zone's DNSKEY RRs into zone signing key(s) and key signing key(s) may be useful, as the key signing key(s) in such a case can still be kept offline and may have a longer useful lifetime than the zone signing key(s).

By itself, DNSSEC is not enough to protect the integrity of an entire zone during zone transfer operations, as even a signed zone contains some unsigned, nonauthoritative data if the zone has any children. Therefore, zone maintenance operations will require some additional mechanisms (most likely some form of channel security, such as TSIG, SIG(0), or IPsec).

10. DNS Security Document Family

The DNSSEC document set can be partitioned into several main groups, under the larger umbrella of the DNS base protocol documents.

The "DNSSEC protocol document set" refers to the three documents that form the core of the DNS security extensions:

1. DNS Security Introduction and Requirements (this document)
2. Resource Records for DNS Security Extensions [RFC4034]
3. Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions [RFC4035]

Additionally, any document that would add to or change the core DNS Security extensions would fall into this category. This includes any future work on the communication between security-aware stub resolvers and upstream security-aware recursive name servers.

The "Digital Signature Algorithm Specification" document set refers to the group of documents that describe how specific digital signature algorithms should be implemented to fit the DNSSEC resource record format. Each document in this set deals with a specific digital signature algorithm. Please see the appendix on "DNSSEC Algorithm and Digest Types" in [RFC4034] for a list of the algorithms that were defined when this core specification was written.

The "Transaction Authentication Protocol" document set refers to the group of documents that deal with DNS message authentication, including secret key establishment and verification. Although not

strictly part of the DNSSEC specification as defined in this set of documents, this group is noted because of its relationship to DNSSEC.

The final document set, "New Security Uses", refers to documents that seek to use proposed DNS Security extensions for other security related purposes. DNSSEC does not provide any direct security for these new uses but may be used to support them. Documents that fall in this category include those describing the use of DNS in the storage and distribution of certificates ([RFC2538]).

11. IANA Considerations

This overview document introduces no new IANA considerations. Please see [RFC4034] for a complete review of the IANA considerations introduced by DNSSEC.

12. Security Considerations

This document introduces DNS security extensions and describes the document set that contains the new security records and DNS protocol modifications. The extensions provide data origin authentication and data integrity using digital signatures over resource record sets. This section discusses the limitations of these extensions.

In order for a security-aware resolver to validate a DNS response, all zones along the path from the trusted starting point to the zone containing the response zones must be signed, and all name servers and resolvers involved in the resolution process must be security-aware, as defined in this document set. A security-aware resolver cannot verify responses originating from an unsigned zone, from a zone not served by a security-aware name server, or for any DNS data that the resolver is only able to obtain through a recursive name server that is not security-aware. If there is a break in the authentication chain such that a security-aware resolver cannot obtain and validate the authentication keys it needs, then the security-aware resolver cannot validate the affected DNS data.

This document briefly discusses other methods of adding security to a DNS query, such as using a channel secured by IPsec or using a DNS transaction authentication mechanism such as TSIG ([RFC2845]) or SIG(0) ([RFC2931]), but transaction security is not part of DNSSEC per se.

A non-validating security-aware stub resolver, by definition, does not perform DNSSEC signature validation on its own and thus is vulnerable both to attacks on (and by) the security-aware recursive name servers that perform these checks on its behalf and to attacks on its communication with those security-aware recursive name

servers. Non-validating security-aware stub resolvers should use some form of channel security to defend against the latter threat. The only known defense against the former threat would be for the security-aware stub resolver to perform its own signature validation, at which point, again by definition, it would no longer be a non-validating security-aware stub resolver.

DNSSEC does not protect against denial of service attacks. DNSSEC makes DNS vulnerable to a new class of denial of service attacks based on cryptographic operations against security-aware resolvers and security-aware name servers, as an attacker can attempt to use DNSSEC mechanisms to consume a victim's resources. This class of attacks takes at least two forms. An attacker may be able to consume resources in a security-aware resolver's signature validation code by tampering with RRSIG RRs in response messages or by constructing needlessly complex signature chains. An attacker may also be able to consume resources in a security-aware name server that supports DNS dynamic update, by sending a stream of update messages that force the security-aware name server to re-sign some RRsets in the zone more frequently than would otherwise be necessary.

Due to a deliberate design choice, DNSSEC does not provide confidentiality.

DNSSEC introduces the ability for a hostile party to enumerate all the names in a zone by following the NSEC chain. NSEC RRs assert which names do not exist in a zone by linking from existing name to existing name along a canonical ordering of all the names within a zone. Thus, an attacker can query these NSEC RRs in sequence to obtain all the names in a zone. Although this is not an attack on the DNS itself, it could allow an attacker to map network hosts or other resources by enumerating the contents of a zone.

DNSSEC introduces significant additional complexity to the DNS and thus introduces many new opportunities for implementation bugs and misconfigured zones. In particular, enabling DNSSEC signature validation in a resolver may cause entire legitimate zones to become effectively unreachable due to DNSSEC configuration errors or bugs.

DNSSEC does not protect against tampering with unsigned zone data. Non-authoritative data at zone cuts (glue and NS RRs in the parent zone) are not signed. This does not pose a problem when validating the authentication chain, but it does mean that the non-authoritative data itself is vulnerable to tampering during zone transfer operations. Thus, while DNSSEC can provide data origin authentication and data integrity for RRsets, it cannot do so for zones, and other mechanisms (such as TSIG, SIG(0), or IPsec) must be used to protect zone transfer operations.

Please see [RFC4034] and [RFC4035] for additional security considerations.

13. Acknowledgements

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No doubt the above list is incomplete. We apologize to anyone we left out.

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Authors' Addresses

Roy Arends
Telematica Instituut
Brouwerijstraat 1
7523 XC Enschede
NL

EMail: roy.arends@telin.nl

Rob Austein
Internet Systems Consortium
950 Charter Street
Redwood City, CA 94063
USA

EMail: sra@isc.org

Matt Larson
VeriSign, Inc.
21345 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166-6503
USA

EMail: mlarson@verisign.com

Dan Massey
Colorado State University
Department of Computer Science
Fort Collins, CO 80523-1873

EMail: massey@cs.colostate.edu

Scott Rose
National Institute for Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8920
USA

EMail: scott.rose@nist.gov

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